The ghost of Machiavelli: An approach to operation Gladio and terrorism in cold war Italy by Ganser, Daniele
Crime, Law & Social Change (2006) 45: 111–154
DOI: 10.1007/s10611-006-9015-7 C© Springer 2006
The ghost of Machiavelli: An approach to operation Gladio and
terrorism in cold war Italy
DANIELE GANSER
Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, Switzerland
Abstract. In 1990, a document was made public in Italy that shed new light on the secret aspects
of the Cold War in Western Europe. The document, dated 1 June 1959, had been compiled
by the Italian military secret service SIFAR and is entitled “The special forces of SIFAR and
Operation Gladio”. It explained that a secret stay-behind army linked to NATO had been set
up in Italy for the purpose of unconventional warfare. Ever since, there have been allegations
in Italy that the Gladio stay-behind army was linked to acts of terrorism during the Cold War.
Despite their importance for criminal, legal and social investigations into the secret history of
the Cold War, these questions have received next to no attention among the English-speaking
research community since the documents’ discovery, partly due to language barriers. With
no claim to deal with the stay-behind armies in an exhaustive manner, this essay attempts to
analyse and contextualise the Italian data.
1. Introduction
In the summer of 1990, Venetian judge Felice Casson discovered the exis-
tence of a hitherto unknown so-called “stay-behind army” linked to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) while investigating mysterious acts of
right-wing terrorism in Italy. The documents proving the existence of these
clandestine forces were found by Casson in Rome in the archives of the Italian
military secret service SISMI (Servizio Informazioni Sicurezza Militare, pre-
viously known as SIFAR, Servizio Informazioni Forze Armate). Casson found
that it was the military secret service who directed the secret stay-behind army
which in Italy operated under the code-name “Gladio”, the “Sword”. Casson
found evidence that similar structures existed also in numerous other countries
in Western Europe. For a few weeks in late 1990, the Gladio discoveries led
to a political scandal in Italy and beyond, with the British daily The Observer
claiming that the “the best-kept, and most damaging, political-military secret
since World War II” had been discovered.1
Following the discoveries in Italy the parliament of the European Union
(EU) debated the legal, social and political implications of the discovery. In
a special resolution passed on 22 November 1990 the EU parliament made it
clear that it “Condemns the clandestine creation of manipulative and opera-
tional networks and calls for a full investigation into the nature, structure, aims
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and all other aspects of these clandestine organisations or any splinter groups,
their use for illegal interference in the internal political affairs of the countries
concerned, the problem of terrorism in Europe and the possible collusion of
the secret services of Member States or third countries”. Due to the prominent
role of the Pentagon and NATO in the secret operation the EU parliament in
its resolution stressed that it “Protests vigorously at the assumption by certain
US military personnel at SHAPE and in NATO of the right to encourage the
establishment in Europe of a clandestine intelligence and operation network”.
As the EU parliament itself had no authority to investigate security affairs
which remained in the sovereign domain of each EU member state it urged
that further investigations into the affair should be carried out in all countries
concerned. Therefore its resolution requested “all the Member States to take
the necessary measures, if necessary by establishing parliamentary commit-
tees of inquiry, to draw up a complete list of organisations active in this field,
and at the same time to monitor their links with the respective state intelli-
gence services and their links, if any, with terrorist action groups and/or other
illegal practices”.2
In 2000, exactly one decade after the EU parliament had passed its resolu-
tion, it became clear that only very little progress had been made in this field
of research. Only three countries, namely Italy, Belgium and Switzerland, had
carried out a parliamentary investigation into their secret armies and presented
a public report.3 The parliamentarians who had tried to shed some light on
this largely unknown aspect of modern European history found it extremely
difficult to gain access to the facts and in some cases suffered from mental
and physical strain. Senator Carlo Schmid, the president of the Swiss parlia-
mentary investigation into the Swiss secret army P-26, lost several kilos of
weight during the investigation and declared when the task was completed:
“I was shocked that something like that is at all possible”, adding that he was
glad to leave “the conspiratorial atmosphere” which during the investigations
had weighed upon him “like a black shadow.”4
As the parliamentary reports of Switzerland, Belgium and Italy were pub-
lished in German, French and Italian respectively, and as furthermore all other
countries had failed to investigate their secret armies, international research
into NATO’s secret armies progressed only very slowly. Even experts on in-
ternational law, criminal law, European history and cold war history had great
difficulties relating to the topic, as next to no English books or scientific arti-
cles had been published on the topic in the 1990s.5 While it had been alleged
in Italy in 1990 that similar secret armies existed also in other countries of
Western Europe, this claim was only confirmed officially for Switzerland and
Belgium. The links to the US Pentagon, to NATO, to the US intelligence ser-
vice CIA and the British intelligence service MI6 remained mysterious and
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unclear. Above all, it remained also completely mysterious whether the secret
armies had been linked to crime, terror, torture and coup d’e´tats.
In the absence of further efforts of the EU parliament to clarify the facts and
the history of NATO’s secret armies the author has researched fifteen different
countries and in January 2005 published his findings.6 The reader will find
the detailed international story of NATO’s secret armies in that book, while
this essay focuses on Italy specifically. All in all, the research confirmed that
secret stay-behind armies had indeed existed in the NATO countries Germany,
Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy,
Greece and Turkey, as well as in the neutral countries Sweden, Switzerland,
Finland and Austria. They had been set up after World War Two and trained
to become operational as a guerrilla army in case of a Soviet invasion or in
case of a takeover of power of the communist parties in the democracies of
Western Europe. The data available confirmed as well that NATO’s Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, coordi-
nated the secret stay-behind armies through two clandestine committees, the
Allied Clandestine Committee (ACC) and the Clandestine Planning Commit-
tee (CPC) in which the CIA and MI6 regularly met with representatives of the
European military secret services. Last but not least the data confirmed that
in a number of countries links to crime, terror, coup d’e´tats and torture were
either confirmed or alleged.
In today’s world, which is greatly concerned with international terrorism,
such disquieting findings should presumably have lead to a thorough inves-
tigation of NATO’s secret armies and all alleged or proven links to terrorism
by all NATO members. For NATO today, under the leadership of the admin-
istration of George Bush junior, has declared that fighting terrorism ranges
amongst its most important tasks, with ongoing military operations in both
Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet NATO’s secret armies and their links to terrorism are
not being investigated, and both parliamentarians and academics encounter
great difficulties when attempting to tackle this research field. Many of the
original documents were destroyed after the discovery of the stay-behind net-
works. Furthermore, documents that were not destroyed remain classified and
inaccessible to historians and political scientists. FOIA requests to the CIA
regarding access to Gladio documents by both the Washington-based National
Security Archive (NSA) and the author were turned down.7 The author has
also requested from NATO access to documents relating to the stay-behind
network via the embassy of his native Switzerland, but this request was also
rejected.8
Given this difficult research context, the most valuable original historical
document on Operation Gladio and NATO’s stay-behind armies still today
remains the one found by Felice Casson in the archives of the Italian military
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secret service SIFAR. It is dated 1 June 1959 and is entitled: “The special forces
of SIFAR and Operation Gladio”. Combined with the parliamentary reports
which were published in Italy the country remains therefore still today one
of the key theatres in which NATO’s secret armies can be studied and I shall
therefore in this paper focus on this most valuable document and deal with
Italy only. Without claiming to deal with NATO’s stay-behind armies in an
exhaustive manner my attempt is to offer a close reading and contextualisation
of the 1959 SIFAR document, which I have translated from Italian into English
and which is contained in the appendix, and relate it to secondary sources in
order to contribute to a better understanding of both NATO’s stay behind
armies, Italy’s secret Cold War history, and the ongoing so called “war on
terrorism”.
2. The CIA in Italy
The CIA was active in Italy during the entire Cold War period. Indeed, Italy
was the first country in the world where the newly-founded CIA in 1948
secretly carried out a covert operation to prevent the Italian Communist Party
PCI (Partito Communisto Italiano) from winning the first national elections.
Throughout the Cold War, the CIA fought the strong PCI with various means
and strategies, until the PCI was dissolved in February 1991.
The Italian left is convinced to this day that it was due to this secret
war of the CIA that the PCI, despite its strength in national elections and in
parliament, never reached executive power in Italy during the Cold War. On
the other side of the debate, Italian Conservatives, including former members
of the US-supported Christian Democrats (Democrazia Christiana Italiana,
DCI), insist that CIA operations in Italy were a reasonable response to the
fears engendered by Communist subversion during the Cold War, pointing out
that it was only the security framework provided by Washington that allowed
Italy to become one of the most advanced and richest societies in the world.
The historical evidence now available confirms that the battle between
the CIA and the PCI followed the global Cold War fault lines very closely.
Washington knew that Moscow was providing large sums of money to the PCI,
while Moscow also knew that Washington was providing financial support to
the DCI. Therefore, when Italian communists, like Gianni Cervetti, confirmed
after the end of the Cold War that the PCI had received ample funds from the
Soviet Union, they highlighted at the same time that the Christian Democrats
had had the same relationship with Washington.9
This Cold War division of the country had its origins in the years that
followed the defeat of Italy in World War II and the death of fascist leader
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Benito Mussolini. According to the Jalta agreements reached by Churchill,
Roosevelt, and Stalin in February 1945, Italy was to be integrated into the
anti-Communist alliance of western democracies. Nevertheless, US President
Harry Truman and his newly-founded National Security Council (NSC) were
greatly concerned about the strength of the Italian Communist Party. The
PCI was the largest Communist party in Western Europe and enjoyed much
popularity and respect in Italy for its resistance against the fascist dictatorship
of Mussolini and the alliance of Italy with Hitler. For the first national elections
on 16 April 1948, the PCI had united with the Italian Socialist Party (Partito
Socialisto Italiano, PSI) to form the Popular Democratic Front (FDP, Fronte
Democratico Popolare). Observers expected the FDP to gain the majority
in the Italian parliament, as the FDP had shown its muscle in municipal
elections preceding the national vote, routinely assigning the US supported
anti-communist DCI to second place.
It was in this context that the CIA was given the straightforward task of
preventing the Italian Communist party from winning the 1948 elections. The
first numbered document issued by the National Security Council, NSC 1/1 of
14 November 1947, summarized the threat as follows: “The Italian Govern-
ment, ideologically inclined toward Western democracy, is weak and is being
subjected to continuous attack by a strong Communist Party.”10 Therefore, the
National Security Council in one of its first meetings on 19 December 1947
adopted directive NSC 4-A, which ordered CIA Director Roscoe Hillenkoet-
ter to undertake a broad range of covert activities to prevent a Communist
victory in the coming Italian election. NSC 4-A was a top-secret document,
as US covert activities in Western Europe were particularly sensitive. There
were only three copies, one of which Hillenkoetter had “closely guarded in
the Director’s office, where members of his own staff who did not ‘need to
know’ could gain no access to it.”11 The “reason for so great secrecy was
altogether clear”, the official CIA history records, for “there were citizens of
this country at that time who would have been aghast if they had learned of
NSC 4-A”.12
In its covert operation, the CIA supported the DCI with US$10 million.
At the same time, Communists and Socialists were targeted with smear cam-
paigns. Among other operations, the CIA issued anonymous pamphlets with
sexual and personal defamations of PCI candidates, as well as smearing them
with the Fascist and/or anti-Church brush. This tactic of targeting specific
seats to give control to the DCI, rather than going for a complete sweep, was
successful in all but two of the 200-plus seats selected. In the final round
of elections, the DCI won 307 seats with 48 per cent of the vote, while the
leftist FDP coalition unexpectedly won only 31 per cent of votes, and was
left defeated with only 200 seats.13 Protests by the public and the left were
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answered with heavy-handed repression, leading to a “strikingly high number
of victims during demonstrations and land occupations.”14
The great success of the covert action operation in Italy led president Tru-
man to expand the powers of the CIA to a global scale. Only two months
after the manipulation of the Italian vote, on 18 June 1948, the NSC passed
another directive (NSC 10/2) that authorised the CIA to carry out covert action
operations in all countries of the world, which created a covert action branch
within the CIA under the name of “Office of Special Projects”, a label soon
changed to the less revealing “Office of Policy Coordination” (OPC). NSC
10/2 directed that OPC was to “plan and conduct covert operations”. With
“covert operations”, NSC 10/2 referred to all activities “which are conducted
or sponsored by this government against hostile foreign states or groups or
in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and
conducted that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to
unauthorised persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plau-
sibly disclaim any responsibility for them.” Specifically, according to NSC
10/2, covert action operations “shall include any covert activities related to:
propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage,
anti-sabotage, demolition, and evacuation measures; subversion against hos-
tile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerril-
las and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist
elements in threatened countries of the free world.”15
After the defeat of the Communists and the Socialists at the polls, Italy
joined NATO as a founding member on 4 April 1949 under the rule of the DCI.
In order to enhance the stability of the country, Italy’s first post-war military
secret service was created on 30 March 1949, just days before Italy joined
NATO. Under the control of the Defence Ministry, the military secret service
SIFAR (Servizio Informazione Forze Armate) was staffed with staunch anti-
Communists, with General Giovanni Carlo as its first director. With its superior
financial means, the CIA greatly influenced the SIFAR throughout the Cold
War, a well-known fact within the Italian security establishment. As Paulo
Taviani, Italian Defence Minister from 1955 to 1958, put it, the Italian military
secret service had always been given orders and financed by “the boys in Via
Veneto”, i.e. the CIA in the US embassy in the heart of Rome.16
While the Italian right welcomed this protection by Washington, the Ital-
ian left criticised that the SIFAR was just a puppet of the CIA. This di-
vide between the political left and the political right characterises much
of the historical debate in Italy to this day. In this ongoing debate, not
only the specific operations of the CIA in Italy during the Cold War re-
main controversial, but above all also the interpretation of these opera-
tions, with the Italian left regularly arguing that the CIA crippled the Italian
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democracy through manipulation and terrorism, and the Italian right insisting
that the CIA saved Italy from becoming a totalitarian satellite dominated by
Moscow.
3. The discovery of Gladio in Italy in 1990
While the CIA manipulation of the 1948 national Italian election has been
known and investigated by researchers for more than two decades, the details
of operation Gladio, arguably a much larger anti-Communist covert operation
of the CIA in Italy, are only gradually beginning to emerge. Investigations
started in January 1990, when in order to re-evaluate a mysterious right-wing
terrorist attack in the village of Peteano in 1972, Italian judge Felice Casson
requested permission from the highest Italian authorities to extend his research
to the archives of the Italian military secret service. In July 1990, Italian Prime
Minister Giulio Andreotti consented and allowed Casson to research in the
archives of Palazzo Braschi, the headquarters of the Italian military secret
service in Rome.
It was in the archives of Palazzo Braschi that Casson discovered SIFAR
documents that proved for the first time that a secret CIA-linked army of the
Italian military intelligence existed in Italy under the codename “Gladio” –
“Sword”. The data found by Casson suggested that this secret army was linked
to NATO and seems to have manipulated Italian politics in a number of covert
action operations during the Cold War in order to weaken the political left.
This knowledge meant that Casson was in serious danger for some time, as
right-wing hit squads had assassinated Italian judges before: “From July until
October 1990, I was the only one who knew anything [about Gladio]; this
could have been unfortunate for me”, the judge later recalled to the press.17
Casson confidentially informed the Italian parliamentarian commission
that already had been investigating for several years, under the chairmanship
of Senator Libero Gualtieri, mysterious acts of terrorism that Italy had suffered
from in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Gualtieri and his fellow senators were
greatly worried by the Casson’s findings and agreed that the investigation into
the Gladio secret army had to be included in the work of the commission,
for it seemed to represent the key to both the terrorist attacks and the reasons
why they had remained mysterious for so many years. On 2 August 1990, the
senators therefore ordered the head of the Italian executive, Prime Minister
Giulio Andreotti, “to inform the parliament within sixty days with respect to
the existence, characteristics and purpose of a parallel and occult structure
that is said to have operated within our secret service of the military with the
aim to condition the political life of the country.”18
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The next day, on 3 August 1990, Prime Minister Andreotti took a stand in
front of the parliamentary commission and, for the first time in Italy’s post-
war history, confirmed as an acting member of the Italian government that a
NATO-linked secret security structure had existed in the country. Andreotti
assured the senators that he would present a written report to the parliamentary
commission on the secret security structure within sixty days: “I will present
to the Commission a very precise report which I have asked the Defence
Department to prepare. It is about the activities based on NATO planning that
have been started for the eventuality of an attack and occupation of Italy or
parts of Italy.”19
The Italian senators were greatly interested to learn whether this secret
army still existed and what operations exactly the Italian military secret service
had carried out during the Cold War. While it was well known that SIFAR had
engaged in a number of illegal domestic operations throughout the Cold War,
and had been forced to change its label first to SID (Servizio Informazione
Difesa, 1965 to 1977), and then again to SISMI (Servizio per le Informazioni
e la Sicurezza Militare, since 1978) after several scandals, most of its covert
action operations remained in the dark. Rumours and leaks, two legendary
components of Italian political culture, had long claimed that a top-secret
parallel military unit existed within the Italian military secret service, a so-
called “parallel SID”, but specifics on these mysterious Italian special forces
had been lacking.20
In his first reply to the senators in early August, Andreotti had claimed that
the secret army had long been dissolved: “As far as I have been informed by
the secret services, such activities have continued until 1972. After that, it was
decided that they were no longer necessary.”21 The year 1972 had been chosen
with much care by Andreotti, because in 1974 as acting defence minister, he
had gone on the record as stating to a judicial inquiry investigating right-
wing massacres: “I can say that the head of the secret services has repeatedly
and unequivocally excluded the existence of a hidden organisation of any
type or size.”22 In 1978, Andreotti had offered the same testimony in front of
judges investigating a fascist bombing in Milan. If Andreotti had confirmed
to the senators in 1990 that secret special forces still existed within the Italian
military secret service, he could have been accused of having offered false or
misleading testimony in 1974 and 1978.
Yet Andreotti’s claim that the secret Gladio army had been dissolved in
1972 had a very short life only, and the cover story collapsed already two
months after he had offered it to the senators. On 9 October 1990, a construc-
tion worker redecorating an apartment in Via Montenevoso in Milan removed
a plaster panel under a window in one of the rooms and discovered a secret
cache containing money, arms and documents. The documents consisted of
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416 photocopied pages of handwritten letters of Aldo Moro, the leader of the
Christian Democratic party, who in 1978 had wanted to include the PCI for
the first time in the Italian government, against the fierce opposition of the
United States, and thereafter had been kidnapped and killed, allegedly by the
left-wing terrorist group Red Brigades.
The discovery of Via Montenevoso raised a number of questions. The
police had already discovered in 1978 that the apartment had been used by the
Red Brigades, and after its discovery, the apartment had been “taken apart,
wall by wall, brick by brick”, as an official confirmed to the press.23 While
nobody could explain how the sensitive material could have been overlooked
at the time, or who could have deliberately planted it years later and why, all
agreed that the letters of Moro were genuine and contained information not
previously known, including on the secret Gladio army. In one of his letters,
Moro explicitly referred to the top-secret stay-behind network and the training
for guerrilla activities “to be carried out against occupying enemy forces or
counter-guerrilla activities to be undertaken against enemy forces operating
as such on our territory.”24 This destroyed Andreotti’s claim that the secret
army had been dissolved in 1972.
Moro in his letters was very critical of the CIA’s financing of the Chris-
tian Democrat party (DCI), despite the fact that he himself was a member
of the DCI, and lamented DCI member Andreotti’s close relations “with his
colleagues in the CIA” and the fact that Andreotti had directed the secret ser-
vices both as Defence Minister and as Prime Minister “for longer than anyone
else.” Moro, in captivity and expecting his assassination by the terrorist Red
Brigades, bitterly concluded that if he survived, he would certainly resign
from the DCI party, because, as Moro saw it, the DCI under Andreotti and
Cossiga deliberately refrained from freeing him from the Red Brigades be-
cause of his plan to include the PCI in the government. Moro felt that he had
been bitterly betrayed. In 1978, Andreotti was serving as Prime Minister and
Francesco Cossiga as Interior Minister. “I’ve been killed three times over”
captured Moro wrote to Cossiga. “By inadequate protection, by your refusal
to negotiate, and by weak statements that enraged my captors.”25 In his last
letter, Moro asked that nobody of the Christian Democrat party be present at
his funeral. After his dead body was found, he was buried in the presence of
his family and closest friends only.
The Christian Democrats Party (DCI), which had been created by the
United States after World War II as a bulwark against the PCI and had con-
trolled executive power in Italy for half a century, was left strongly discred-
ited by the Montenevoso papers and was dissolved after the end of the Cold
War in 1993. Moreover, as far as the stay-behind evidence was concerned,
the Montenevoso papers forced Prime Minister Andreotti to reconsider his
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now-discredited claim that the secret Gladio army had been closed down in
1972.
On 24 October 1990, Andreotti handed a ten-page report entitled “The so
called ‘Parallel SID’ – The Gladio Case” to the Senate investigative commis-
sion under Senator Gualtieri, in which he corrected himself, explaining that
the secret army had not been closed down in 1972, but was still active and
operational. Unwilling to shoulder the far-reaching accusation of conspiracy
alone, Andreotti insisted on the same day in front of parliament that “each
chief of government has been informed of the existence of Gladio.”26 This
compromised among others former socialist Prime Minister Bettino Craxi
(1983–1987), former Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini of the Republican
party (1981–1982), who in 1990 was acting President of the Senate, former
Prime Minister Arnaldo Forlani (1980–1981) who was acting secretary of the
Christian Democrats Party, and above all former Prime Minister Francesco
Cossiga (1978–1979), who was now the Italian President. The high-ranking
magistrates drawn into the scandal by Andreotti reacted with confusion. Craxi
claimed that he had not been informed, until he was confronted with a docu-
ment on Gladio that he had signed himself as prime minister. Spadolini and
Forlani also suffered from general amnesia, but later had to make smaller
amendments to their statements, while Spadolini explained that there was a
difference between what he knew as former defence secretary and what he
knew as former prime minister.27 Only Francesco Cossiga, Italian president
since 1985, said that he was “proud of the fact that we have kept the secret
for 45 years.”28
In his written 10-page report, Andreotti explained that Gladio was the
Italian branch of a secret stay-behind army that had been set up after World
War II by the CIA and SIFAR as part of a network of clandestine resistance
within NATO countries to confront a potential Soviet invasion. In case of inva-
sion, the stay-behind armies would have operated behind enemy lines and set
up a resistance movement. The secret stay-behind armies were supervised and
coordinated by two secret unconventional-warfare centres of NATO named
ACC and CPC, as Andreotti revealed: “Once the clandestine resistance organ-
isation was constituted, Italy was called upon to participate . . . in the works
of the CCP (Clandestine Planning Committee) of 1959, operating within the
ambit of SHAPE [NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] . . .;
in 1964 the Italian secret service also entered the ACC (Allied Clandestine
Committee).”29
While Andreotti admitted that the Gladio special forces had not been
dissolved years ago, but were still active, he stressed in his report that the
Italian military secret service in general, as well as the Gladio members
in particular, had nothing to do with the terror that Italy had suffered from
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during the Cold War. He explained that all members of the Gladio network
had gone through intensive testing before their recruitment and were cho-
sen based on the “rigorous application” of the Secret Service Act to ensure
their “scrupulous fidelity to the values of the anti-fascist republican consti-
tution” and to exclude anyone who held administrative or political office.
Andreotti in his report insisted that “the pre-selected subjects do not have
a penal record, do not partake in active politics, nor participate in any sort
of extremist movement.”30 However, when challenged to reveal the names
of the Gladiators, the prime minister regretted that these had to remain se-
cret, as the “operation, on account of its current forms of organisation and
application – as foreseen by NATO directives and integrated into its re-
lated planning – is to be carried out and refined in a framework of absolute
secrecy.”31
In order to be able to operate independently of regular forces in case of
a Soviet invasion, the secret stay-behind army controlled independent arms
caches. According to Andreotti, the equipment had been provided by the CIA
and was hidden in 139 arms caches across the country in forests, meadows
and even under churches and cemeteries. The Gladio arms caches included
“portable arms, ammunition, explosives, hand grenades, knives and daggers,
60-mm mortars, several 57-mm recoilless rifles, sniper rifles, radio transmit-
ters, binoculars, and various tools.”32
As the names of the Gladiators were not revealed, the Italian press focused
on the arms caches and started a nation-wide search. Padre Giuciano recalls
the day when the press came to search for the hidden Gladio secrets in his
church with ambiguous feelings: “I was forewarned in the afternoon when
two journalists from ‘Il Gazzettino’ asked me if I knew anything about arms
deposits here at the church. They started to dig right here and found two boxes
right away. Then the text also said a thirty centimetres from the window. So
they came over here and dug down. One box was kept aside by them because it
contained a phosphorous bomb. They sent the Carabinieri [Italian paramilitary
police] outside whilst two experts opened this box, another had two machine
guns in it. All the guns were new, in perfect shape. They had never been
used.”33
The Italian press, above all on the left, was very critical of the Gladio rev-
elations. The daily La Stampa commented: “No raison d’e´tat could be worth
maintaining, covering up, or defending a secret military structure composed
of ideologically selected members – dependent upon, or at least under the in-
fluence of, a foreign power – that allegedly serves as an instrument of political
struggle. It cannot be defined as any less than high treason and an attack on
the Constitution.”34 In the Italian Senate, representatives of the Green Party,
the Communists, and the Independent Leftist Party accused the government
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of having used the Gladio units for domestic surveillance and acts of terror to
condition the political climate.
Above all, the Italian Communist Party PCI was convinced that not foreign
armies, but they themselves had been the true target of the Gladio armies during
the entire post-war period: “With this mysterious Parallel SID, conjured up
to head off an impossible coup by the left, we have seriously risked making
a coup d’e´tat by the right possible . . . We cannot accept that . . . this super-
SID was passed off as a military instrument destined to operate ‘in case of
enemy occupation’. The true enemy is only and has always been the Italian
Communist party, i.e. an internal enemy.”35 The PCI challenged the CIA to
confirm that Gladio had been an instrument to control the Italian left during
the Cold War, and in December 1990 Admiral Stansfield Turner, director
of the CIA from 1977 to 1981, was asked in a television interview about
the sensitive Gladio army. Turner, however, strictly refused to answer any
questions about Gladio. When the journalists persisted with regard to the
victims of the numerous non-clarified terrorist attacks in Italy, the former CIA
director angrily ripped off his microphone and shouted: “I said, no questions
about Gladio!” whereupon the interview was over.36
4. NATO and operation Gladio
Beyond the political battle and the emotional agitation surrounding the scan-
dal in Italy, calm and detailed scientific analysis of operation Gladio has
progressed only very slowly. This is mainly because historians and political
scientists have had very limited access not only to primary documents from
the CIA, but also to data from the Italian military intelligence service. A no-
table exception to this rule is the now publicly accessible Gladio document of
the Italian military secret service SIFAR found by judge Casson with the title
“The Special Forces of SIFAR and Operation Gladio” dated June 1 1959. The
13-page document is in Italian and classified top secret, it’s English translation
is contained in the appendix of this paper.
The 1959 SIFAR document notes that “The possibility of an emergency sit-
uation, either through domestic upheaval or through military invasion forces,
that involves all or some of the territories of the NATO countries, has for some
time already been the subject of studies and preparations. Some of these stud-
ies and preparations have been carried out on the level of NATO, others have
been carried out on a national level.”37 The most important insight offered by
this paragraph is the confirmation that NATO prepared for a twofold threat
during the Cold War: First, a Soviet invasion; this threat and the respective
preparations has already been the subject of numerous academic books and
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analysis. Yet secondly, the document also confirms that NATO also prepared
for a second scenario which involved an emergency situation resulting from
“domestic upheaval”. This domestic threat, unlike the threat of a Soviet inva-
sion, has gained only limited attention so far among the research community,
largely because it was not clearly known whether NATO had prepared for it,
and how.
The crucial phrase “domestic upheaval” in the Italian original reads
“sovvertimenti interni”. While “interni” clearly must be translated with “do-
mestic”, the word “sovvertimenti” covers a larger semantic connotation and
ranges from “upheaval”, to “insurgency”, “coup”, “revolution”, “erosion”,
and “uprising”. In each case, a change of power within Italy is implied. As the
SIFAR document explicitly differentiates between a military invasion and a
domestic upheaval, one might by implication assume that the domestic threat
had nothing to do with the Soviet Red Army but focused on an internal fight
among Italians. Within the Cold War context, this domestic threat as seen
by NATO and the National Security Council in the United States was above
all the Communist party of Italy. At times, as certain findings in the German
stay-behind context suggest, the threat perceived by NATO may also have
included the European Socialist parties.38 The code word “Gladio” of the se-
cret operation was hence well chosen, for it is derived from the Latin word
“gladius” for the short Roman sword that is double-edged and literally cuts
both ways: against a domestic and against a foreign enemy.
The Generals who directed the Italian secret army Gladio met regularly
with representatives from foreign countries, as a rule the directors of the
other secret armies in Western Europe. In order to coordinate the operations
of the secret armies NATO’s SHAPE had set up two secret committees, the
CPC (Clandestine Planning Committee) and the ACC (Allied Clandestine
Committee), which were used for the secret international meetings of the
representatives of the secret armies. According to the accounts of two former
members of the Italian military intelligence service, the atmosphere and work-
ing conditions varied greatly in the ACC and the CPC. Italian General Paolo
Inzerilli, who commanded the Italian Gladio stay-behind force from 1974 to
1986, and later wrote a book on the topic, highlighted that the “omnipresent
United States” dominated the CPC. According to Inzerilli, the United States,
together with the other nuclear powers France and Great Britain, formed a
so-called “Executive Group” within the CPC that presided over the other
NATO nations within the secret meetings. The CPC, as Inzerilli confirmed,
had been founded “by order of the Supreme Commander of NATO Europe.
It was the interface between NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe (SHAPE) and the Secret Services of the member states as far as the
problems of non-orthodox warfare were concerned.”39
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After France had expelled NATO from its territory, the new European
NATO headquarters, including the CPC, were set up in Belgium. “The meet-
ings were held on average once or twice a year in Brussels at CPC headquarters,
and the various problems on the agenda were discussed with the ‘Executive
Group’ and the Military”, Inzerilli related.40
General Gerardo Serravalle, a former Italian military intelligence opera-
tive who as predecessor of Inzerilli had headed the Gladio secret army from
1971 to 1974, related in his book on operation Gladio that “in the 1970s, the
members of the CPC were the responsible officers of the secret structures of
Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and
Italy. These representatives of the secret structures met every year in one of
the capitals.”41 Serravalle had represented Italy in the CPC and confirmed the
dominance of the US highlighted already by Inzerilli. Allegedly, the US dis-
patched officers from the CIA and the US Special Forces to the meetings. “At
the stay-behind meetings, representatives of the CIA were always present”,
Serravalle remembered. “They had no voting rights and were from the CIA
field office in the capital in which the meeting took place.” Also, “members of
the US Forces Europe Command were present, also without voting rights.”42
The ACC, which was created after the CPC, seems to have been a much
less formal and hierarchical organisation. Inzerilli claims that “relations in the
ACC (Allied Clandestine Committee) were completely different” from those
in the CPC. “The atmosphere was clearly more relaxed and friendly compared
to the CPC”. The ACC, founded by “ a specific order from SACEUR to CPC”,
supposedly “became a sub branch” of the CPC.”43 Apparently, the body served
above all as a forum in which know-how on stay-behind operations and secret
warfare was exchanged between the numerous heads of intelligence: “The
ACC was an essentially technical committee, a forum where information on
the experiences made were exchanged, where one spoke of the means available
or the means studied, where one exchanged information on the networks, etc.”,
Inzerilli recalls. “It was of reciprocal interest. Everybody knew that if for an
operation he lacked an expert in explosives or in telecommunications or in
repression, he could request them from another country without difficulty,
because the agents had been trained in the same techniques and used the same
materials.”44
The last phrase of Inzerilli’s statement raises the delicate question of
whether the secret stay-behind armies limited their Cold War operations to
training and were otherwise waiting for the Soviet invasion, or whether they
were given orders to become active in times of peace in order to counter
or prevent “domestic upheavals”. Inzerilli’s reference to “experts in repres-
sion” can be read as to imply domestic operatoins. Also General Serravalle
was aware of the delicacy of the notion of a secret army operating in times
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of peace against a domestic threat, and lamented with much regret that in-
deed at times some Gladio members “could pass from a defensive, post-
invasion logic, to one of attack, of civil war.”45 When he was asked in a
BBC interview why, given this manifest danger, he did not decide to close
the network down, Serravalle replied: “Well, closing down is a political
decision, it is not in my sphere of competence to close down the Gladio
operation.”46
General Serravalle was not the only Italian who had emphasized that he was
in no position to terminate Operation Gladio. General Vito Miceli, a former
senior member of the NATO Security Office and director of the Italian military
secret service SID from 1970 to 1974, made a similar point when he refused
to accept any personal responsibility, and instead blamed the White House in
the United States. In the context of investigations into right-wing terrorism in
Italy in 1974, Italian judge Giovanni Tamburino had taken the unprecedented
step of arresting SID director Miceli on charges of “promoting, setting up, and
organising, together with others, a secret association of military and civilians
aimed at provoking an armed insurrection to bring about an illegal change in
the constitution of the state and the form of government.”47
During his trial, a furious Miceli declared on 17 November 1974: “A Super
SID on my orders? Of course! But I did not organise the coup d’e´tat myself. It
was the United States and NATO who asked me to do it!”48 Thereafter Miceli
lost his position as chief of the Italian military secret service, was released
on bail and spent six months in a military hospital. When sixteen years later
Miceli heard how Prime Minister Andreotti had revealed the Gladio secret
before the Senate, he could hardly believe it. Shortly before his death in
October 1990, Miceli angrily protested: “I have gone to prison because I did
not want to reveal the existence of this super-secret organisation. And now
Andreotti comes along and tells it to Parliament!”49
This necessarily distorted data from personal memoirs underlines that
above all, two categories of NATO documents would be of particular interest
to future research into stay-behind organisations. First, the NATO strategic
stay-behind doctrine, which according to General Serravalle is entitled “Di-
rective SHAPE”, which allegedly was the official reference, if not the proper
Allied Stay-Behind doctrine”. Secondly, the transcripts of the ACC and CPC
meetings would be of significant interest. Serravalle said that he had read
some of the minutes of the CPC during his career. Some may have been de-
stroyed, others remain classified and “relate to the training of Gladiators in
Europe, how to activate them from the secret headquarters in case of complete
occupation of the national territory, and other technical questions such as, to
quote the most important one, the unification of the different communication
systems between the stay-behind bases.”50
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5. Gladio headquarters CAG on Sardinia
The 1959 SIFAR document explains that within the military secret service
SIFAR the section SAD of the Office R was responsible for operation Gladio
and cooperated closely with the CIA on the basis of written bilateral agree-
ments between the two secret services. When the Italian Senators, attempting
to shed some light on this secret international cooperation, demanded that the
director of the Italian military secret service, Admiral Fulvio Martini, gave
them the secret documents on the cooperation with the CIA the latter strictly
refused. “The agreement between SIFAR and the CIA of 1956 concerning the
stay-behind organization can not, as of now, be made public, as it is a bilateral
agreement classified top-secret”, Martini explained to the startled Italian sen-
ators, who protested his decision, saying that SIFAR was answerable to the
Italian legislative and not to the CIA. “The declassification of the document,
which I have already requested on 13 December 1990,” Martini insisted, “is
necessarily dependent on the agreement of the other party involved”, and as
the CIA declined the request, the Italian senators could do little more than
voice their protest against Italy’s limited sovereignty and this bizarre distortion
of democratic checks and balances.51
Among other operations the CIA and SIFAR cooperated closely in order to
set up an operational base for the secret army on the Italian island of Sardinia
in the Mediterranean sea off the coast of Italy, as the Senators found. The CIA
had “confirmed its support for the base ‘which is being included in the war
plans of the United States”’, the 1959 document noted. It is now known that
the Gladio base on Sardinia was the most expensive and prestigious project
of SIFAR in the 1950s. SIFAR Director Giovanni de Lorenzo, flush with CIA
funds amounting to several million lira at the time, charged SIFAR Colonel
Renzo Rocca, Chief of Office R, with supervising the construction of the
new Gladio base.52 The Gladio headquarters, dubbed the “Saboteurs’ Train-
ing Centre” (Centro Adestramento Guastatori, CAG), was located at Capo
Marragiu near the village of Alghero. Behind walls and high-security elec-
tric fences, a little harbour was built, underground bunkers were constructed,
strong long-distance radio transmitters were set up, underwater facilities were
installed for training frogmen, and two small runways for airplanes and a heli-
copter landing pad were built. Several other specialized buildings were added
for shooting and explosives training as well as for indoctrination.53
“I was at Capo Marragiu for the first time in 1959”, Gladiator Ennio Colle
testified after the end of the Cold War. He explained that members of the secret
unit were kept in the dark on the larger international framework and at the
time did not even know where they were trained: “I didn’t know where I was
because we were transported in planes with blacked-out windows.” Decimo
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Garau, a Gladio instructor at CAG on the island Sardinia who had been trained
in Great Britain, confirmed to journalists that Italian Gladiators were literally
kept in the dark: “They arrived in an unmarked plane and were transferred
to an unmarked coach. They were then dropped off in front of their quarters.
Then training would start.”54
6. The Gladio stay-behind network
The 1959 SIFAR document does not only explain that within the Italian mil-
itary intelligence service section SAD was responsible for Operation Gladio,
but specifies as well that SAD was subdivided into six units: First, a central
command, presumably located within SIFAR headquarters in Rome. Second,
the Gladio training centre and operative stay-behind base CAG on the island
Sardinia. Third, a directive group labelled “first group” with responsibilities
for “general organisational matters”. Fourth, a “second group”, responsible for
“special organisational matters”. Fifth, a “third group”, responsible for run-
ning the secret radio transmission system. The sixth and final part of SAD was
the “fourth group”, responsible for logistical support of the secret army with
airplanes and air transport. Some members of SAD were instructed abroad,
as the document confirms: “elements of SAD had followed training courses
at the schools of the American secret service”, without specifying the exact
school and location.
Presumably the Italian Gladio officers were instructed by both the CIA and
US Special Forces of the Pentagon. Maybe they were trained at the most promi-
nent CIA paramilitary school, Camp Peary, located in Tidewater, Virginia, in
the United States, which everyone in the Agency simply called “the Farm”.
They did cooperate with the US Special Forces, including the Green Berets,
for they would have had to join forces behind enemy lines in case of a Soviet
invasion, according to NATO planning. US Special Forces were created in
the United States at about the same time that a secret army was set up in
Italy. After the dissolution of the US wartime intelligence service, the Office
of Strategic Services (OSS), at the end of World War II, it was not until the
summer of 1952 that the US Special Forces were reborn with headquarters at
Fort Bragg, Virginia, and the first special forces unit, somewhat misleadingly
called the 10th Special Forces Group, started its training under Colonel Aaron
Bank. As early as November 1953, the 10th Special Forces Group erected its
first overseas base in a former Nazi SS building in Germany that had been set
up during Hitler’s reign in 1937, in the Flint Kaserne at Bad To¨lz in Bavaria.
Italian Gladio commander General Serravalle related that as directing of-
ficer, he had visited the Green Berets in Bad To¨lz in 1972.55 “I have visited
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the 10th Special Forces Group at Bad To¨lz at the old former SS barracks at
least twice. Their commander was Colonel Ludwig Fastenhammer, a Rambo
ante-litteram”.56
The SIFAR document specifies that in order to limit the potential damage
to the entire network, the secret army was divided into five larger units, which
in turn were subdivided into a number of nuclei or core units. The members
of the core groups did not know each other and were only connected through
the central SAD command. According to the SIFAR document, the five larger
units carried the names “Alpine Star”, “Marine Star”, “Azalea”, “Rhododen-
dron”, and “Broom”. As charts at the end of the SIFAR document show, each
unit was made up of operational personnel “ready for action”, and a second
group of men who had been contacted and could be recruited in times of need,
designated as “to be mobilised”.
According to the SIFAR document, “Alpine Star” consisted of 1,000 men
ready for action, plus 1,000 men who could be mobilised, for a united total
strength of 2,000 men. “Marine Star” had 200 men ready for action, plus 200 to
be mobilised, totalling 400 men. The “Rhododendron” consisted of 100 troops
on standby and 100 to be mobilized, thus 200 in total; the same applied to the
“Azalea” and “Ginestra” groups. Taken together, the numerical strength of the
Italian Gladio standby force amounted to 1,500 men, with an additional 1,500
men that could be mobilised in case of need, giving a maximum numerical
strength of 3,000 men. Facing the Soviet army, that would amount to a small
group, yet within the context of an Italian civil war between the political right
and the political left 3000 armed and trained men with an operation base,
equipment and communication gear can have a significant impact.
7. Operation Gladio and terrorism
The most difficult and most sensitive area of all stay-behind research concerns
the field of domestic subversion and Gladio terrorism. The 1959 SIFAR doc-
ument, as seen above, explicitly stressed that besides the stay-behind task, the
secret army had also been set up to carry out domestic control tasks in case
of an “emergency situation” created by a “domestic upheaval”. Given this
context and Washington’s well known opposition to the Italian Communist
party, observers in the press have rushed to the conclusion that Gladio was
used during the Cold War to fight the PCI through domestic subversion and
terrorism.
But did the Gladio structure indeed figure in right-wing coup plots from
the mid-1960s to the early 1980s? And if so, what was its role? Did SIFAR
cooperate with right-wing terrorists, or were Gladio personnel involved in
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the right-wing terror bombings? Were plastic explosives or other ordnance
from secret Gladio arms caches used in these bombings, and if so, how did
this equipment find its way into the hands of the terrorists? If Gladio was
indeed implicated in right-wing coup plots and terrorism, how much did the
US Pentagon and the White House know about these activities, and how was
NATO involved? Since even Italian judges have great difficulties in answering
these questions satisfactorily today, it remains impossible for an academic to
deal with them in an exhaustive manner. As they have surfaced repeatedly in
the Gladio debate, however, they cannot be neglected and shall be approached
here at the conclusion of this paper, offering indications where further research
is needed.
The most famous right-wing terrorist that SIFAR had cooperated with was
Vincenzo Vinciguerra, a member of the Italian fascist organisation Ordine
Nuovo. In many ways, Vinciguerra started the Gladio scandal, for he killed
three Carabinieri in Peteano with a car bomb in 1972. This terrorist attack
had for many years discredited the Italian left because SIFAR had blamed the
extreme left-wing terrorist organisation Brigate Rosse for the crime. But in
1984, judge Felice Casson had reopened the long-dormant Peteano case, after
having discovered with surprise an entire series of blunders and fabrications
surrounding the Peteano atrocity. Casson found that there had been no police
investigation on the scene. He found that the anonymous call to the police
that had implicated the Red Brigades two days after the attack had never been
verified. He also discovered that claims in the police report at the time to
the effect that the explosive used in Peteano had been the one traditionally
used by the Red Brigades were false, and that Marco Morin – like terrorist
Vinciguerra a member of the Italian right-wing organisation “Ordine Nuovo”
– as an expert for explosives of the Italian police had deliberately provided
the fake expertise. Judge Casson was able to prove that contrary to Morin’s
expertise, the explosive used in Peteano was C4, the most powerful explosive
available at the time, also used by NATO and stored in the Gladio arms
caches.
These findings, which were both sensational and disturbing, led Casson to
continue his research in the SIFAR archives in Rome where, in the summer of
1990, he discovered Operation Gladio and forced Prime Minister Andreotti
to take a stand in front of the Italian Senate commission, as described above.
“I wanted new light to be shed on these years of lies and mysteries, that’s
all,” Casson told journalists years later in his tiny office in an 18th century
courthouse on the banks of Venice’s lagoon. “I wanted Italy for once to know
the truth.“57.
Right-wing terrorist Vinciguerra was arrested in 1984 in the context of the
Casson investigation and testified that in 1972, it had been comparatively easy
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for him to escape from the security forces because not only the SIFAR, but
large segments of the Italian security apparatus had supported crimes that dis-
credited the left. After the bombing, “a whole mechanism came into action”,
Vinciguerra recalled, “that is, the Carabinieri, the Minister of the Interior, the
customs services, and the military and civilian intelligence services accepted
the ideological reasoning behind the attack.”58 The SIFAR, Casson found, had
deliberately followed a so-called “strategy of tension”, through which it had
manipulated political violence. “As far as the secret services are concerned,
the Peteano attack is part of what has been called ‘the strategy of tension”’,
Casson explained in a BBC documentation on Operation Gladio. “That is to
say, to create tension within the country to promote conservative, reactionary
social and political tendencies. While this strategy was being implemented, it
was necessary to protect those behind it because evidence implicating them
was being discovered. Witnesses withheld information to cover right-wing
extremists.”59
“With the massacre of Peteano”, Vinciguerra explained at his trial in 1984,
“and with all those that have followed, the knowledge should by now be clear
that there existed a real live structure, occult and hidden, with the capacity
of giving a strategic direction to the outrages.” The structure, he said, “lies
within the state itself. There exists in Italy a secret force parallel to the armed
forces, composed of civilians and military men, in an anti-Soviet capacity,
that is, to organise a resistance on Italian soil against a Russian army.” It
was an extremely far-reaching testimony, for it revealed Operation Gladio
in Italy for the first time. Vinciguerra added that what he was describing
was”a secret organisation, a super-organisation with a network of commu-
nications, arms, and explosives, and men trained to use them.” Vinciguerra
claimed that this “super-organisation [which], lacking a Soviet military inva-
sion which might not happen, took up the task, on NATO’s behalf, of pre-
venting a slip to the left in the political balance of the country. This they did,
with the assistance of the official secret services and the political and military
forces.”60
After this testimony Vinciguerra immediately lost all higher protection he
had enjoyed during the previous twelve years and was imprisoned for life. In
jail, reporters asked him why the Gladio network had been used for terrorist
attacks: “You had to attack civilians, the people, women, children, innocent
people, unknown people far removed from any political game” Vinciguerra
reasoned behind prison bars. “The reason was quite simple. They were sup-
posed to force these people, the Italian public, to turn to the state to ask for
greater security. This is the political logic that lies behind all the massacres
and the bombings that remain unpunished, because the state cannot convict
itself or declare itself responsible for what happened.”61
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If it is true that SIFAR cooperated with right-wing terrorists and Operation
Gladio in terrorist attacks, then due to the very close cooperation between
SIFAR and CIA, the questions arise how much the CIA and the White House
knew about these crimes, and whether they either attempted to prevent SIFAR
from this deviation, or even supported the strategy? According to the testimony
of General Gerardo Serravalle, who had directed the Gladio secret army from
1971 to 1974, the CIA had urged SIFAR to focus more on domestic operations
than on the Soviet threat. “When I took over command, I noticed that the
American financing agreed in bilateral accords, and in particular the shipping
of material and armaments to us had stopped“, Serravalle angrily recalled the
disruption of the supply that had occurred in 1971.
Serravalle said that in order to voice his protest, he had later asked the CIA
chief of station in Rome, Howard Stone, to come to the Gladio headquarters
CAG in Sardinia. Stone came with CIA officer Mike Sednaoui, and Serravalle
(according to his own testimony) said to them: “This is our training etc.,
you could help us achieve our full potential. So why cut your aid? If this is
your government’s position, we accept it. But you owe us an explanation.”
Thereafter he allegedly realized “that the CIA interests, as represented by these
officials, weren’t really concerned with the level we had reached in training,
but rather on the subject of internal control. That is, our level of readiness to
counter street disturbances, handling nation-wide strikes and above all any
eventual rise of the Communist Party. Mr. Stone stated, quite clearly, that the
financial support of the CIA was wholly dependent on our willingness to put
into action, to program and plan these other – shall we call them – internal
measures.”62
In March 2001, General Giandelio Maletti, the former head of Italian
counter-intelligence, went even further and suggested that the CIA had di-
rectly promoted terrorism in Italy. Shortly before Christmas 1969, four bombs
exploded in public places in Rome and Milan, killing 16 and maiming and
wounding 80, most of them on the Piazza Fontana in Milan. After the massacre,
the Italian secret service had planted bomb parts in the villa of well-known
leftist editor Giangiacomo Feltrinelli in order to blame the terror on the Com-
munists and the extreme left. Only years later was it revealed that the Italian
extreme right had carried out the atrocity in order to promote the strategy of
tension.
“The CIA, following the directives of its government, wanted to create an
Italian nationalism capable of halting what it saw as a slide to the left, and, for
this purpose, it may have made use of right-wing terrorism” Maletti testified
in the Piazza Fontana trial. “The impression was that the Americans would
do anything to stop Italy from sliding to the left,” the General explained, and
added: “Don’t forget that Nixon was in charge and Nixon was a strange man,
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a very intelligent politician, but a man of rather unorthodox initiatives.“ In
retrospect, the 79-year-old Maletti offered criticism and regret: “Italy has been
dealt with as a sort of protectorate” of the United States. “I am ashamed to
think that we are still subject to special supervision.”63 Following these far
reaching claims Maletti was sentenced to 31 years of prison which he did not
serve, however, as he had set up his home in South Africa beyond the reach
of the Italian justice system.
According to the research of Italian judge Guido Salvini, arguably the
leading expert on terrorism in Italy, medical doctor Carlo Maria Maggi helped
the CIA and NATO to link up with Italian right-wing terrorists. One of Maggi’s
men was Carlo Digilio, a CIA agent and expert for explosives. “As an expert
for weapons and explosives and as an agent of the CIA I had the task to support
the units in the handling and storage of the material” Digilio explained. “But
the members of the units of course did not know that, for they were not
really friends of the Americans. They wanted a military dictatorship as the
one in Spain or Greece, or the system of Mussolini, whereas we wanted
to preserve liberal democracy.” Digilio stressed that everything was carried
out under the strictest secrecy procedures. “Actually only Maggi knew of
it, and I knew it because of my special position as an expert for arms and
explosives.”64
If Digilio’s claim that the CIA was supplying Italian right-wingers with
arms and explosives is correct, then the questions remains whether the CIA
knew that these explosives were being used to promote terrorism in Europe.
“One evening in Mai 1974 . . . a group of men who knew each other met for
dinner at the restaurant of Marcello Soffiati and his father in Colognola ai
Colli close to Verona. Regular guests in this restaurant included American
military officers” who were stationed at the NATO military base in Verona as
Digilio explained. “On this evening next to Maggi, the two Soffiati and me also
Sergio Minetto was present. Minetto was an important person, for the outside
world he was just a man who fixed refrigerators. But in reality he was a CIA
agent and worked on a higher command level as the contact man among the
Americans and our boss Maggi. This evening Maggi told Minetto that another
large bomb attack was going to take place in a few days.” Digilio according to
his own testimony on this specific conspiracy, had to check whether the bomb
was operational. It was and exploded on May 28 1974 in Brescia in the midst
of an anti-fascist demonstration, killing eight and injuring and maiming 102.
According to the testimony of Digilio the CIA indeed promoted terrorism in
Europe.65
While more research is required, in Italy and internationally, into these sen-
sitive criminal operations and their links to SIFAR and Operation Gladio, an-
other crucial research focus concerns the question of whether Gladio personnel
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or equipment were also involved in the failed coups d’e´tat that had taken
place in Italy during the Cold War. Much of this debate focuses on the role
that the Gladio headquarters CAG played during the “Piano Solo” silent coup
d’e´tat in 1964. Within the political struggle in Italy during the Cold War,
the leading members of the ruling DCI party were well aware of the secret
Gladio headquarters on Sardinia. “To the men of Gladio from Giulio An-
dreotti”, read a shiny brass plate hanging above the billiard table at the Gladio
headquarters CAG in Sardinia, reminding the conspirators of their powerful
high-level cover. The plate was removed in 1990.66 But could the DCI have
ever used the base and the Gladiators against their political opponents, the
Communist PCI and the Socialist PSI, if these two parties challenged the
DCI?
The 1959 SIFAR report noted that the CAG “is protected by a particularly
sophisticated security system and is equipped with installations and apparatus
designed to be employed in case of emergency.” This passage of the document
has lead to considerable irritation and criticism in Italy, for it can be read to
imply that the Sardinia Gladio training base could in case of an emergency
also be used as a prison for political opponents, for its high walls and barbed-
wire fences did not only protect the base from the outer world, but could also
prevent people inside the base from leaving it.
After the CIA-manipulated elections of 1948, the DCI effectively con-
trolled the Italian executive for numerous years. This changed in the Italian
national elections of April 1963, when the CIA’s worst fears materialized:
The DCI fell to 38 percent of votes, its worst result since 1948, while the
PCI polled 25 percent, and together with the PSI’s 14 percent, secured an
overwhelming victory for the Italian left. US President John F. Kennedy was
firm in his conviction that the PCI, despite their strength at the polls, could
not be allowed to gain ministerial posts in the Italian executive. But Kennedy,
despite the opposition of parts of his administration, was equally firm that
it was now time to allow the Italian Socialists to enter the Italian executive
for the first time since the end of the war. To highlight his commitment to
change, Kennedy paid a visit to Italy, with his plane touching down at Rome’s
airport Fiumincino on 1 July 1963. The Italian Socialists were delighted, and
Pietro Nenni, the leader of the Italian Socialists and a veteran of the Spanish
Civil War, spoke enthusiastically of Kennedy: “He is a wonderful person.
He seems much younger than his real age. He invited me to visit the United
States!”67
After Kennedy’s assassination in Dallas in November 1963, the Italian So-
cialist ministers lost much international support, and within Italy, the CIA and
SIFAR prepared to remove the Socialists from government. William Harvey,
the CIA chief of station in Rome, urged Colonel Renzo Rocca, chief of SI-
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FAR’s office R, which ran Operation Gladio, to use “his action squads” to
“carry out bombings against Christian Democrat Party offices and certain
newspapers in the north, which were to be attributed to the left.”68 When the
Socialists remained undisturbed, General De Lorenzo, who had directed the
SIFAR from 1956 to 1962, started Operation Piano Solo on 14 June 1964
and, in an atmosphere of great political tension, entered Rome with troops,
tanks, armoured personnel carriers, jeeps, and grenade launchers, while NATO
forces staged a large military manoeuvre in the area.
Whether Piano Solo was indeed an Italian Cold War coup d’e´tat, or whether
it was more of an opera buffa, remains contested within the academic commu-
nity. Paul Ginsborg claimed that De Lorenzo’s “scheming, although obviously
dangerous, had that incomplete and in some respects farcical character which
has characterized all the plots against the Republic since 1964”.69 Italian
scholar Franco Ferraresi was more critical of the coup and condemned “the
plan’s truly criminal nature”, lamenting that Piano Solo had had an immense
influence “in obstructing and voiding the content of the first Left coalition
– perhaps the only genuine attempt at a reformist government in the entire
post-war period.”70 Meanwhile, Bernard Cook labelled Piano Solo “a carbon
copy of Gladio”.71
Even today, due to the neglect of intelligence records, many scholars would
mistakenly argue that unlike in Greece or Turkey, there was never a coup
d’e´tat in Italy during the Cold War, despite the fact that US scholar Richard
Collin gave a fairly good description of the events already in 1976.72 Piano
Solo arguably was clearly a coup d’e´tat because the Italian government was
changed through military pressure. At the same time, it is true that it was a
“soft” coup, because not a single shot was fired and the operation remained
secret for numerous years. But behind the scenes, a “highly unusual meeting
between a Prime Minister in the midst of a political crisis and a General plan-
ning to replace him with a sterner regime” had taken place in the summer of
1964.73 Aldo Moro, the DCI prime minister, had been pressured by General
De Lorenzo to replace the critical and outspoken Socialist ministers in his
government with more moderate Socialists. Moro, aware of the manifest mil-
itary threat, abided and formed a new more moderate government. “Suddenly,
the political parties realized that they could be replaced. In case of a power
vacuum resulting from the failure of the Left, the only alternative would have
been an emergency government”, Pietro Nenni of the Socialist party recalled
years later; “in the reality of this country, this would have meant a right-wing
government,” he added.74
The Italian senators investigating Operation Gladio suggested in their final
report in 1995 that General De Lorenzo had threatened the Moro government
and the Socialists with the Gladio prison in Sardinia. “There is no doubt
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that the operation corresponded to the interests followed by sectors of the
administration of the United States”, the senators criticized, and pointed out
that the CAG on Sardinia would have served as a political prison for up to
1,200 people designated by SIFAR proscription lists if Moro had not given
in. When the senators demanded to see the 1964 proscription lists as part of
their Gladio investigation SIFAR refused to make them available. “This is a
very grave situation,” the senators concluded, “for one can assume that the
list contains the names of parliamentarians and political functionaries, and the
publication of it would withdraw any basis from the claim that the events of
1964 had been cautious operations in order to prevent public disturbances”.75
Another Senate investigation into Gladio in 2000 went even further and ques-
tioned the Gladiators directly. Gladiator Manlio Capriata, who as a general
had directed office R within the Italian military secret service SIFAR from
February to June 1962, testified to the senators: “I confirm that the V sec-
tion, and therefore the S/B [stay-behind] organisation, and therefore the CAG
[Gladio centre Centro Addestramento Guastatori in Sardinia] had an anti-
subversive function in the case that the forces of the left should come to
power.”76
8. Conclusion
A close reading of the document “The Special Forces of SIFAR and Opera-
tion Gladio” and its contextualisation have led to a number of findings on the
secret history of the Cold War in Italy. Foremost among these findings is the
fact that a secret army codenamed “Gladio”, or “Sword”, had existed in Italy
during the Cold War. Secondly, it was established that this secret army was
strategically directed against both a Soviet invasion and domestic upheaval,
and thus, by implication, against the strong Italian Communist party or parts
of the Italian Socialist party. Thirdly, it emerged that this secret army had
cooperated with and was supported by the US foreign intelligence service,
the CIA. Fourth, that this secret army was linked to NATO through the Clan-
destine Planning Committee (CPC) and, according to the testimony of former
members of the Italian military secret service, to the Allied Clandestine Plan-
ning Committee (ACC). Sixth, that secret stay-behind armies existed in other
Western European countries, too. Seventh, that in Italy, the secret army had
a maximal strength of 3000 men and was hidden within the military secret
service SIFAR, where the section SAD commanded the network. And the last
but not least of these findings was that as of the second half of the 1950s, the
secret army was running its own training and command centre CAG on the
island of Sardinia.
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Most delicate, of course, remain all questions with regard to the links of the
secret NATO army to acts of crime and terrorism. After having heard numerous
witnesses and analysed a considerable amount of classified documents, the
official Italian Senate investigation into Gladio and the massacres concluded
its work in 1995 and presented a 370-page final public report. “The final
picture that emerges from the analysis is one of a country that for more than
40 years has lived through a difficult frontier situation”, the senators noted.
“Obviously, the tensions which have characterised these 40 years and which
were the object of the analysis also had social, and therefore internal, roots.
However, such tensions would never have lasted as long and they would not
have taken on such tragic dimensions as they did, and the path towards the truth
would not have been blocked so many times, if the internal political situation
had not been conditioned and supervised by the international framework into
which Italy was integrated.”77
This vague formulation, it is interesting to note, resulted from the structure
of the discourse within the parliamentary commission. It is notable that the
“frontier situation” label did not only apply to Italy during the Cold War, but
also to the parliamentary commission itself. In the commission the communist
and socialist senators of the left strongly disagreed with the Christian Demo-
cratic senators of the right on how to interpret the Italian Cold War and the
role of the United States in Italy, on how to deal with certain highly sensitive
topics including left-wing terrorism, massacres, and right-wing terrorism, and
on how to phrase and publish what they had found.
All senators agreed that the Italian Cold War was particularly violent by
comparison with other countries of Western Europe. The overall death toll
of the terror of the 1970s alone is estimated at several hundreds killed, with
right-wing commandos responsible for the majority of killings. Given this
tragic situation many Italians expected more clarity from the Senate inves-
tigation into Gladio. “Many commentators have accused the commission on
the massacres for not having produced, after so many years of research, a
clear understanding of why Italy was the platform for such tragic and in-
explicable events”, journalists therefore asked Senator Giovanni Pellegrini.
“Do you think this is a well-founded accusation?” The senator conceded
that “all reference to the international contest” had been excluded from the
scope of his commission’s investigation as well as from the reports it had
produced in 1995 for much too long. Above all, as Pellegrini explained,
the role of the United States in Cold War Italy and its support for the se-
cret army had not been addressed in frank terms by the Senate commis-
sion. “The great limitation of our culture was therefore that we did not con-
textualize the internal events with the framework of the international Cold
War.”78
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In order to correct this deficit of the 1995 Gladio report, eight senators,
most of whom belonged to the Democratic Left Party (Partito Democratico
della Sinistra, PDS), which had replaced the Italian Communist party after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, continued their research under the chair-
manship of Senator Giovanni Pellegrini, heard witnesses, saw documents,
and presented their own 326-page report without the consent of the entire
commission in June 2000.79 The former Communists concluded in their fi-
nal Senate report that – apart from preparing for a Soviet invasion – during
the Cold War the secret Gladio army had, together with the CIA, the Italian
military secret service, and selected Italian right-wing terrorists fought the
Italian Communists and the Italian Socialists for fear that the latter would
betray NATO “from within”. “Those massacres, those bombs, those military
actions had been organised or promoted or supported by men inside Italian
state institutions and, as has been discovered more recently, by men linked
to the structures of United States intelligence”, the Italian commission under
Senator Pellegrini concluded.80
To support their far-reaching findings, which linked the United States to
terrorism in Italy, the senators included in their report testimonies of sev-
eral witnesses who had been closely involved in Operation Gladio. Gladiator
Giuseppe Tarullo, who had entered the Italian military secret service SIFAR
in 1961, had testified to the senators that besides invasion preparations, their
task had been to control the Italian Communists: “Among ourselves, we also
spoke of the internal task of Gladio. It was said that the structure and its for-
eign connections would also have been activated against domestic subversion
with support by the Special Forces. We understood “domestic subversion”
to mean a change of government that did not respect the will of the ruling
authority.”81 Gladiator Giuseppe Andreotti had testified to the senators during
the interrogation: “The Gladio structure was the answer to an internal logic,
in the sense, as I have already said, that it had to react against the rise to power
in Italy of regimes hated by the population . . . thus dictatorships of the right
or the left.”82
These testimonies confirm what a close reading of the 1959 SIFAR
document had revealed, i.e., that besides a post-invasion task, the stay-
behind network also had a domestic control function. This domestic con-
trol function was carried out in a grey area in which illegal operations were
planned and carried out, presumably by US military personnel from the
NATO base in Verona, representatives of the CIA and SIFAR in cooper-
ation with Italian right-wing terrorists. In the context of today’s US lead
so-called “war on terrorism” it is particularly disturbing to find allegations
that the United States might have sponsored terrorism in Europe and in Italy
through clandestine operatives might have been involved in the Piano Solo
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coup d’e´tat in 1964, the Piazza Fontana Massacre in 1969, the Peteano ter-
ror attack of 1972 and the Brescia terror attack of 1974. These suspicions
must therefore be rigorously investigated in a joint effort of the US and the
EU in order to clarify these matters as requested by the EU parliament in
1990.
“In order to keep the power, one has to use terror sometimes”, the Italian
philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli suggested 500 years ago.83 Today, most
observers would agree that this is a highly problematic strategy. Not only
Italians, but citizens across the globe witness that state-sponsored and private
terrorism have returned with a vengeance. Yet which part of the ongoing
global terror is private, thus for instance “Al Qaida terror”, and which part
is state sponsored so called “false flag terrorism” which poses as private Al
Qaida terror, is one of the most difficult questions to answer. Controversial
claims continue to surface in numerous countries on the alleged or proven
involvement of military secret services in recent terrorist attacks. In Indonesia,
for instance, on the third anniversary of the bombing that killed 202 people in
Bali on October 12, 2002, former Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid
said that he had grave concerns about links between Indonesian authorities
and terrorist groups. Wahid claimed that the bomb which destroyed Bali’s
Sari Club was state sponsored terrorism. Asked who he thought planted this
bomb, Wahid said: “Maybe the police . . . or the armed forces.” The former
president insisted that these were not private Muslim terrorists acting alone.
“The orders to do this or that came from within our armed forces, not from
the fundamentalist people,” he said.84 Wahid seemed to suggest that the ghost
of Machiavelli haunts the planet.
Appendix
Translation of the 13 pages long document Stato Maggiore della Difesa.
Servizio Informazioni delle Forze Armate. Ufficio R – Sezione SAD: Le forze
speciali del SIFAR e l’operazione GLADIO. Roma, 1 Giugno 1959 from Italian
to English by the author. The document has been published by Mario Coglitore
(ed.): La Notte dei Gladiatori. Omissioni e silenzi della Repubblica (Padova,
1992), pp. 118–130.
PAGE ONE OF THIRTEEN – TOP SECRET
General Staff of the Defence Ministry
Military Intelligence Service [SIFAR]
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Office “R” – Section “SAD”
Rome, 1 June 1959
The “Special Forces” of SIFAR and Operation “Gladio”
I. The possibility of an emergency situation, either through domestic upheaval
or through military invasion forces, that involves all or some of the territories
of the NATO countries, has for some time already been the subject of
studies and preparations. Some of these studies and preparations have been
carried out on the level of NATO, others have been carried out on a national
level.
On the NATO level the following activities must be noted:
1. The activities of the C.P.C. in Paris (Clandestine Planning Committee),
created by SHAPE, with consulting functions during times of peace; and,
in times of war, with the task to define the possible participation of the
special services of the allied nations to the actions of SACEUR in the field
of special operations.
2. A number of meetings between the S.M.D. [Italian General Staff] and
AFSOUTH [NATO Allied Forces Southern Europe Command in Naples,
Italy] in order to study the possible organization of the Italian clandestine
forces.
3. The several years old invitation of SHAPE to the national SS.MM. for the
planning of non orthodox warfare.
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In above activity number 1. the SIFAR [Italian Military Intelligence Servizio
Informazioni delle Forze Armate] participates through its representative,
namely the director of office “R”.
In above activity number 2. the SIFAR has participated presenting infor-
mation and suggesting programs.
Above activity number 3. is above all of interest to the General Staff
of the different FF.AA. [Armed Forces, Forze Armate] as this activity con-
cerns non orthodox warfare to be carried out by regular branches of the
military.
All in all, these activities linked to NATO remain, for the moment, mostly
on the level of analysis and planning.”
II. On the national level, the possibility of an emergency situation as described
above has been and continues to be the reason for specific SIFAR activities.
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Section SAD of Office “R” is in charge of these special activities, created
on October 1, 1956 with the specific task to “carry out special studies and
trainings of personnel for particular emergencies.”
Aware of the necessity to implement efficient preparations for the even-
tuality of an emergency situation jeopardizing the integrity of the territory or
the national authority, the acting director of the military intelligence service
decided, on the basis of what his predecessors had already accomplished, to
tackle the delicate problem and to move it towards a solution with the creation
of the new section “SAD”.
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Parallel to this decision which was taken by the intelligence service, the di-
rector of SIFAR decided, with the approval of the Defence Minister, to re-
confirm the previous agreements between the Italian intelligence service and
the US intelligence service with respect to the reciprocal co-operation in
the context of the S/B operations (Stay Behind), in order to realize a joint
operation.
The contract which certifies such a plan was agreed upon with date of
November 26, 1956 (see attachment number 1) and entitled “Agreement be-
tween the Italian intelligence service and the intelligence service of the U.S.A.
with regard to the organisation and activity of the Italian-American clandestine
post-occupation network (Stay Behind)”. It constitutes the basis document of
Operation “Gladio” (name given to the operations developed by the two secret
services).
The agreement clarifies the tasks of the two intelligence services with
regard to the organisation and implementation of the joint operation and
is based on the condition of the U.S.A. that “the Italian Chiefs of Staff
plan for the activation of all means in order to keep control of the is-
land of Sardinia” where the base of the operation is located. The intelli-
gence service of the U.S.A. in turn has furthermore confirmed, with date of
October 7, 1957, that it’s support for that base “is part of the war plans of the
U.S.A.”
PAGE FOUR OF THIRTEEN – TOP SECRET
Operation Gladio, apart from the necessities which derive from the threat of an
emergency or an occupation, is based on the concepts as codified by the theory
and the technique of S/B [Stay Behind] operations (see attachment number
2 entitled “Aims and organisational principles of stay-behind operations”,
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as well as attachment number 3 containing the draft of the “Stay Behind
Manual”).
Fundamental documents of Operation “Gladio” are the following:
– the plan of the S/B operations (see attachment 4)
– the S/B organizational plan (see attachment 5)
– the S/B security plan (see attachment 6)
– the S/B recruitment program (see attachment 7)
– the S/B training plan
III. The importance of the “GLADIO” preparations are twofold:
1. The first is of an objective kind and concerns the territories and inhabitants
who unluckily would have to get to know occupation or upheavals. These
territories and inhabitants would receive incitement to resist and support
from operation “GLADIO”.
2. The second is of a subjective kind and concerns the legitimate authority
of the state, who, in case of grave offences against its integrity, would
be equipped with such well-timed and necessary preparations that guar-
antee to the state the prestige and the ultimate capacity to act and to
govern.
The extraordinary political significance (in the real sense of the word) which
a S/B activity of this kind takes on in the hands of the SIFAR follows plainly
from this, because such an activity puts at the disposal of the Defence Min-
ister, in case of an emergency, a far reaching and efficient tool with which to
encourage the liberation of the territory and to re-establish the legal powers
and institutions.
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[one line illegible]
the SIFAR would fail in one of its genuine functions if it did not take
on this delicate and pre-eminent task and either leave the initiative in this
field to chance, or to other uncontrolled groups, or to services with political
interests.
IV. The section “SAD”, as said above, is in charge of the task. It is an organism
that is still in the state of consolidation, but which now has a clear structure
and is operational. It is structured in the following way:
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– Central Command with the task to coordinate Operation “GLADIO”;
– 1st Group responsible for general organisational matters with
regard to the support and activation of the STELLA
ALPINA and the STELLA MARINA, two
organisations which are included in “GLADIO”;
– 2nd Group responsible for special organisational matters and
functioning as a permanent secretariat of the
“GLADIO” organization, responsible for the
activation of the operative branches of “GLADIO”
(Information – Sabotage – Propaganda – Evasion –
Guerrilla Warfare) and the activation of the rapid
deployment units (Rododendro, Azalea, Ginestra);
– 3rd Group responsible for technical matters and radio transmissions
in order to support the short range and long range
connections between “GLADIO”, and responsible for
the radio center [three words illigible]
– 4th Group responsible for airborne activities and logistic and
operational air-support for operation “GLADIO”
– C. A. G. Saboteur’s Training Camp [Centro Addestramento
Guastatori on the island Sardinia] for “training and
experimental activities”. C. A. G. is the operative
training base of operation “GLADIO”
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This is therefore an organisation through which the SIFAR has the command
over the “special forces”, as well as over the organisational and training ap-
paratus and the logistics which are necessary for the operation.
Altogether, the organisation was developed in the past, and continues to
be developed now, in the following way:
1. Organisation of the central command structure (the entire section SAD)
and the general planning of the operation;
2. Organisation and fine tuning of the training base, selection of the in-
structors, the training doctrine, and the training facilities (the Sabo-
teur’s Training Camp [Centro Addestramento Guastatori on the is-
land Sardinia]) which in the future can also be used as the operative
base;
3. Organisation of the communication centre, in support of the operative base,
which is capable of communicating over long distances with the operative
units, and can function as well as a propaganda radio station and a station
for electronic warfare [attivita` radio di propaganda e di disturbo; then one
line illigible];
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4. Planning of the fundamental elements of the organization, such as:
– security plan for the organization;
– plan for the recruitment of the personnel;
– plan for the training;
– organisational plan (adapted to the real possibilities of implementation);
– documentation of the territory, the context, and the objectives
5. Training of officers of the section SAD at the school of the US secret
service [in the USA] and joint trainings on the training base [on the island
Sardinia];
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6. Activation of the operative branches by setting up 40 core groups (each con-
sisting of two or three “operative men” and two radio operators), namely:
– 6 core groups for information gathering (“I”)
– 10 core groups for sabotage (“S”)
– 6 core groups for propaganda (“P”)
– 6 core groups for evasion and escape operations (“E”)
– 12 core groups for guerrilla warfare (“G”)
sharing the tasks “operative missions and radio transmission”, these units
were already set up during times of peace, instead of launching or infil-
trating them only in times of an emergency or an occupation;
7. Setting up of rapid deployment guerrilla units in selected geographical
areas, namely:
– The “ALPINE STAR” [STELLA ALPINA] in the Friul [part of northern
Italy bordering Austria in the north and Slovenia in the east], which linked
up with the already existing organisation “OSOPPO”, of a present size of
about 600 men and tending towards 1000 units of rapid activation, as well
as an additional 1000 men that could be mobilised;
– The “NAVY STAR” [STELLA MARINA, two words illigible], linking up
with the already existing units “GIGLIO” and “GIGLIO II”, of a scheduled
strength of 200 units;
– The “RODODENDRO” [two words illigible], of a scheduled strength of
100 + 200 units;
– The “AZALEA” [two words illigible] of a scheduled strength of 100 + 800
units;
– The “GINESTRA” [two words illigible] of a scheduled strength of 100 +
200 units;
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8. The preparation and distribution of the necessary equipment for the var-
ious units, preferably in store rooms of the secret service and in hidden
caches, namely:
– For the core groups “I” – “S” – “P” – “E” – “G”, specially prepared equip-
ment in containers which can be hidden [in the soil], and radio systems
which are able to communicate over long distances;
– For the rapid deployment units, equipment, arms and munitions of the
traditional kind, though selected for the specific task, as well as radio
systems for communication over short and long distances;
9. Training and qualification for the tasks of the core groups and the rapid
deployment units;
10. Inspection on site and by airplane of those geographical zones of partic-
ular interest;
11. Collection of the cartographic and photographic data of the territory, the
environment, and specific objects, as well as collection of the documen-
tation on the special operations carried out during the Second World War;
12. Training carried out mainly on the Saboteur’s Training Camp [Centro
Addestramento Guastatori on the island Sardinia] in the three areas of
possible deployment:
– Air (air operations and parachute jump)
– Water (water operations and diving)
– Earth (operations in difficult territories)
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V. At the present time, operation Gladio, [three words illegible] central organ-
isations, is developing in the outskirts in order to set up the above described
core groups “Information” – “Sabotage” – “Propaganda” – “Evasion and
Escape” – “Guerrilla” and rapid deployment units.
The organisational plan is directed first of all at setting up arrangements
for Northern Italy (zones I and II), and, of secondary importance, plans to
extend the network into the regions of central and southern Italy (zones III
and IV).
The division of the Italian territory into different zones does not imply a
fixed structure, but is but an organisational tool.
Thus, the organisational plan of operation Gladio foresees the use of the
following contingents of men:
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Organisers
Organisers Functional Organisers
Theoretical Plan Central or Zone (including R/T) Total
1. For the core groups 4 20 24
“I”, “S”, “P”, “E”
2. For the core group “G” 4 4 8
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In practice, keeping in mind also the organisational need of the rapid deploy-
ment units, and in order to achieve the best performance, the theoretical plan
can be cut back in the following way:
Secondary
Central or peripheral or
principal Functional
Practical Plan Peripheral (including R/T) Total
1. For the core groups “I”, “S”, “P”,
“E”
2 8 10
2. For the core group “G” 1 2 3
3. For the rapid deployment units 2 – 2














During the implementation small variations of the above figures are possible.
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S/B Core Number of the
Groups Core Groups Operative Personnel Radio Personnel Total
“I” 6 6 × 2 = 12 6 × 2 = 12 24
“S” 10 10 × 2 = 20 10 × 2 = 20 40
“P” 6 6 × 2 = 12 6 × 2 = 12 24
“E” 6 6 × 2 = 12 6 × 2 = 12 24
“G” (∗) 12 12 × 3 = 36 12 × 2 = 24 60
Total 40 92 80 172
(∗) Another 10 core groups are planed in non specified role for the eventuality of a further
development of the program.
Rapid Rapid Personnel that
Deployment Deployment could be
Groups Personne Lmobilised Total
STELLA ALPINA 1000 1000 2000
STELLA MARINA 200 200 400
RODODENDRO 100 100 200
AZALEA 100 100 200
GINESTRA 100 100 200
Total 1500 1500 3000
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VI. Altogether, the organisation which the Section SAD has been trusted with,
amounts to about 1 500 000 000 Lira, including furniture, installations,
material and equipment, as indicated in attachment number 9.
The provisional budget of the operation amounts, all in all, to 225 million
per year, of which around 125 million are part of the classified budget and
100 million are part of the ordinary budget, excluding the expenses for the
military personal.
Conclusion
Operation Gladio is the answer to an urgent need and ranks today amongst
the most important elements of the preparation of the defence of the country.
This need, although not entirely ignored in the past, has only during the
last years been tackled systematically and brought towards a solution.
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At the present time, the organisation has reached a good level, both in the
field of planning as well as in the field of realization: Steps which have been
prepared long ago are now leading to the growth of the peripheral organisation.
The operations and training base [CAG in Sardinia] is a characteristic
element of the organisation [one line illegible] In terms of its function as a
training centre it represents a novelty in the history of the Italian secret service,
for never in its history has the service had its own specialised school, be it with
regard to the equipment, be it with regard to the instructors, be it with regard
to the doctrine, which can be adapted to the circumstances, and according to
which the agents are trained to carry out clandestine operations.
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In its function as an operative base, the Saboteur’s Training Camp [Centro
Addestramento Guastatori on the island Sardinia] is protected by a particularly
sophisticated security system and is equipped with installations and apparatus
designed to be employed in case of emergency. An essential element of the
base is furthermore its radio communications centre [three words illegible].
Once the construction has been finished, this latter element shall be of the
utmost importance.
These structural elements of operation Gladio underline the high level of
technical sophistication on which the operation is being carried out.
Nevertheless, of primary importance remains the human factor, be it with
regard to the skills that must characterise the directive members of the oper-
ations, be it with regard to the operative members and their dedication to the
S/B program.
By observing the reasons which have led to the realization of the operation,
one notes, on the preceding pages, the important political role which this
organisation could play in the hands of the defence minister in case of war or
an emergency.
Thus operation Gladio contains in itself, faced by today’s international
situation and events that could threaten the integrity of our country, the germ
of the fight for liberty and independence which is always alive.
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148 D. GANSER
3. The Swiss report is: Schweizer Parlament: Bericht der Parlamentarischen Unter-
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